

INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

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DENY

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Action

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Rec'd: November 14, 1962

EUR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 10136/ADCMJB

Info

FROM: Zagreb

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TO: Secretary of State

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NO: 236, November 13, 9 P. M.

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 236, INFORMATION BELGRADE, SARAJEVO UNNUMBERED.

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[ ] told me today that while it is most regrettable, from long range point of view, that U.S. felt it had to act unilaterally in Cuban crisis he well understood President Kennedy's stand when he confronted with Soviet missiles in Caribbean. Were he [ ] in Kennedy's shoes he might well have acted same way even though U.S. action set "a bad precedent" in dealing with difficult problems. [ ] raised question our missiles in Turkey and Italy and I explained to him U.S. position on subject in accordance Department Circular 736 of October 23. [ ] readily conceded that differences between NATO basis in Turkey and Italy and Soviet missiles in Cuba "probably substantial".

[ ] stated that he as well as his colleagues are somewhat at loss to understand Soviet motivation in putting offensive missiles in Cuba. [ ] said that Yugoslav regime had always felt that Castro was "overly provocative" and Tito "warned or intended warn Khrushchev" against being trapped by Castro's "unconstructive approach". What finally happened in Kremlin, [ ] "I do not pretend to know". It is possible of course, [ ] continued, that Khrushchev acted "pressure some military or other elements in Polit-Buro". On other hand, "Khrushchev, knowing him as I do, while being a firm believer in detente, might have had momentary lapse not anticipating Kennedy's firm response." Be that as it may, [ ] added, Khrushchev should be given credit for making full retreat. Retreat, [ ] mused, would seem indicate

/ Khrushchev

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-2- 236, November 13, 9 P. M. from Zagreb.

Khrushchev in firm control Kremlin and that this action in Cuba probably result "personal lapse".

[ ] by the way, at no time mentioned Yugoslav officialdom's view that our basic objection to Castro is ideological rather than strategic. On contrary, he felt U.S. response quite understandable, even though regrettable, in light Khrushchev's action.

KENNAN

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